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 Assumption of Risk in NFL Concussion Litigation: 
The Offhand Empiricism of the Courtroom 
Jeffrey Standen* 
Liability for defective athletic equipment can be difficult to 
prove.1  In the fast-paced environment of contact sports, establishing 
the element of causation can be insuperable. For example, in Tester-
man v. Riddell, where a football player alleged that the manufacturer’s 
representative fitted him with undersized shoulder pads and thus 
caused him serious injury during a scrimmage, the appellate court up-
held the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s case failed for lack of 
definitive proof of causation.2  The plaintiff’s expert failed to establish 
whether or not the injury resulted from the opponent’s blow or con-
tact with the ground, whether or not the injured area was covered by 
the pad at the moment of impact, and whether or not larger pads 
would have precluded the injury in the circumstances.3  Assuming cau-
sation can be established, sports equipment manufacturers may be 
held liable for negligence,4 breach of warranties,5 and defective prod-
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1
 Commonly available defenses include lack of privity and incurred risk.  See generally DAN 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 369-374 (2000); Moore v. Sitzmark Corp., 555 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (incurred risk). 
 2 Testerman v. Riddell, Inc., 161 F. App’x. 286, 288, 290 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Byrns v. 
Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Ariz. 1976) (football helmet design defective). 
 3 Testerman, 161 F. App’x. at 289; see also Fort Lauderdale Country Club, Inc. v. Win-
nemore, 189 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding golf club liable in golf cart 
accident, even where the driver of cart was negligent, and finding the golf club negligent in fail-
ing to keep carts locked away, in that, negligence of an intervening actor should have been fore-
seen). 
 4 McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 144 S.W.2d 866, 871–72 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1940) (finding a negligent failure to test pole used in pole vault); Dudley Sports Co. v. 
Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (finding a negligent design and manufacture of 
pitching machine); James v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 299 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1957) (finding that 
although shattered baseball bat was defective, defendant was not negligent because the risk of 
bats breaking is common knowledge and therefore, not an unreasonable risk). 
 5 Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 387 (Cal. 1975) (finding misrepresentation that a golf 
device was safe and a breach of implied warranty of merchantability); Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 
759 A.2d 582, 592–93 (Del. 2000) (holding that representations found in helmet’s manual created 
express warranties that formed a basis for manufacturer’s liability for off-road motorcyclist’s 
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ucts,6 much like any other manufacturer. Similarly, stadium owners can 
be held liable for defective field conditions.7 
The defense of assumption of risk is disfavored as a general mat-
ter in modern tort law.8  The widespread adoption of comparative fault 
schemes has rendered such absolute defenses to liability no longer as 
relevant.9  Nevertheless, assumption of risk remains a viable doctrine 
in tort cases arising out of sporting contests.10  However, assumption of 
risk has provided a defense only in actions for negligence and not for 
those in which intentional or reckless conduct is alleged.11  In addition, 
                                                                                                                           
neck injury that resulted in paraplegia); Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 655, 662 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding breach of implied warranty of merchantability for golf cart battery 
charger plugs, which caused fire damaging plaintiff’s club house). 
 6 Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 825–26 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1975) (finding liability for failure to warn about danger from trampoline springs); Brett v. 
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., No. CIV–99–981–C, 2001 WL 36162669, at *1, 6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 
2001) (discussing manufacturer’s liability where a pitcher was injured by a batted ball due to the 
bat being defective in allowing batted balls to reach dangerous speeds); Everett v. Bucky Warren, 
Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 658–59 (Mass. 1978) (finding defective design of hockey helmet). 
 7 Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358–59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding the 
defendant was not liable for wet outfield); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 371 N.E.2d 557, 567 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1977) (discussing assumption of risk where player was injured while playing on a tennis 
court with bubbles on the playing surface); Zachardy v. Geneva Coll., 733 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1999) (finding the defendant not liable for divot in baseball field). 
 8 Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 482 
(2002) (“the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Apportionment of Liability, recently adopted by the 
American Law Institute, explicitly repudiates the defense, rejecting the provisions of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts that recognized it.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 2 
cmt. i, 3 cmt. c (2000)) (noting that the modern view is that assumption of risk should be com-
pletely merged or assimilated within comparative fault and abolished as a distinct doctrine); see, 
e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975) (holding that “the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence is preferable to the ‘all-or-nothing’ doctrine of contributory negligence from the 
point of view of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice.”). 
 9 Presently, only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia have retained contribu-
tory negligence.  The other 46 states have rejected contributory negligence and adopted some 
form of comparative negligence.  See Kathleen M. O’Connor & Gregory P. Sreenan, Apportion-
ment of Damages:  Evolution of a Fault-Based System of Liability for Negligence, 61 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 365, 369-70, nn.20-21 (1996); In the federal sphere, comparative negligence has been the 
rule since 1908, in cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, see 45 U.S.C. § 53 
(2006), and since 1920, in cases arising under the Jones Act, see 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006), and the 
Death on the High Seas Act, see 46 U.S.C. § 30304 (2006). 
 10 See generally Keya Denner, Taking One for the Team:  The Role of Assumption of the 
Risk in Sports Tort Cases, 14 SETON HALL. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209 (2004); Timothy Davis, Avila 
v. Citrus Community College District:  Shaping the Contours of Immunity and Primary Assump-
tion of the Risk, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259 (2006). 
 11 Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Turcotte v. Fell, 
502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (N.Y. 1986) (finding failure to allege intentional misconduct rendered the 
defense of assumption of risk available to preclude the claim); Tomjanovich v. California Sports, 
Inc., No.H–78–243, 1979 WL 210977, at *1 (S.D. Tex.Oct. 10, 1979) (finding a defendant may 
not prevail on an assumption of risk defense in a case involving a punch to the jaw of the plain-
tiff  where the intent to injure and the force used is far greater than necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate objective within the score of play); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that “a cause of action for personal injuries between participants incurred 
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even if a participant has assumed the inherent risks of sport, that as-
sumption does not necessarily include an assumption of the risk of 
negligence.12  In products liability cases, assumption of risk typically 
requires that the plaintiff be aware of the risk of defendant’s conduct 
and that the plaintiff have subjectively agreed to accept the risk and to 
encounter it.13  With this type of assumption of risk, the plaintiff must 
subjectively understand the danger, and then voluntarily and not neg-
ligently decide to accept the risk.14 Moreover, some courts have de-
termined that being compelled to take a risk by an employer obviates 
the “voluntariness” requirement of the assumption of risk defense.15  
An employee who is aware of the risk but is required by his employer 
to use the product has not voluntarily accepted the risk.16 
A. Courtroom Empiricism 
In the Ordway litigation, veteran horse jockey Judy Casella was 
thrown from her horse during a race and injured when her mount 
rolled over her.17  Casella’s horse had stumbled after becoming entan-
gled with another race-horse, whose jockey, it was later determined by 
the California Horse Racing Board, violated a racing rule by “crossing 
over without sufficient clearance, causing interference.”18  As a result 
of his violation, the jockey was suspended from racing for five days.19 
                                                                                                                           
during athletic competition must be predicated upon recklessness or intentional conduct, ‘not 
mere negligence.’”); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Mo. 1982) (holding that “a cause of 
action for personal injuries incurred during athletic competition must be predicated on reckless-
ness, not mere negligence.”). 
 12 Konesky v. Wood Cnty Agric. Soc’y, 844 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
“the risk of being trampled by runaway horse was not an inherent risk of horse racing, and thus 
doctrine of primary assumption of risk did not apply”); Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 
So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla. 1986) (finding jockey did not assume risk of negligently located exit gap 
on the racetrack). 
 13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965). 
 14 Id.  
 15 E.g., Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding ‘“a plain-
tiff will not be precluded from recovering except where it is beyond question that he voluntarily 
and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition and thereby must 
be viewed as relieving the defendant of responsibility for his injuries.”’ (quoting Struble 
v. Valley Forge Military Acad., 665 A.2d 4, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). 
 16 Tew v. Sun Oil Co., 407 A.2d 240, 243–44 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (noting that an individual 
who faces a known dangerous condition, rather than risk of losing his job, cannot be said to have 
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury); Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 
1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991) (abolishing assumption of risk in the employment setting in Ohio, and 
holding that an employee does not voluntarily assume the risk of injury when that risk must be 
encountered in the normal performance of required duties). 
 17 Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id.  
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Subsequently, Casella brought a negligence suit.20 The court dismissed 
Casella’s complaint on the grounds that she had assumed the risk that 
another contestant would violate a racing rule.21  “[B]y participating in 
the horse race, she relieved others of any duty to conform their con-
duct to a standard that would exempt her from the risks inherent in a 
sport, where large and swift animals bearing human cargo are locked 
in close proximity, under great stress and excitement.”22  In sports, the 
court added, “[i]f the defendant’s actions, even those which might 
cause incidental physical damage in some sports, are within the ordi-
nary expectations of the participants . . . no cause of action can suc-
ceed based on a resulting injury.”23  The scope of “ordinary expecta-
tions,” the court made clear, includes conduct that comprises “routine 
rule violations” that are “common occurrences” and “within the pa-
rameters of the athletes’ expectations.”24  Less common misfeasances 
are “jury material;” where a player’s misconduct was obviously out-
side of the normal expectations of participants in the sport, liability is 
appropriate.25 
It is upon the distinction between expected and unexpected oc-
currences that most sports tort litigation turn. Here, the unimpressive 
fact-finding methodology of the legal system is visible. An answer to 
the question of the type of conduct athletes expect when playing a 
game appears to demand an empirical inquiry that plumbs the subjec-
tive understanding of veteran players. How often, for instance, must 
bean-balls occur for them to be deemed “reasonably expected” by the 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. at 544. For a different understanding of the relationship between assumption of risk 
and comparative fault, see Segoviano v. Hous. Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579–80, 583 (1983) (in-
volving an injury in a touch football game, holding that comparative fault precludes application 
of assumption of risk, unless such assumption were explicit). 
 22 Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 543; contra Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705 (Cal. 1992) (en 
banc) (stating that the assumption of risk analysis in Ordway was a misinterpretation of Califor-
nia law, and noting that “it is thoroughly unrealistic to suggest that, by engaging in a potentially 
dangerous activity or sport, an individual consents to . . . a breach of duty by others that increases 
the risks inevitably posed by the activity or sport itself, even where the participating individual is 
aware of the possibility that such misconduct may occur.”). 
 23 Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 544. 
 24 Id.  Contra Knight, 834 P.2d at 709 (noting that a proper application of the assumption of 
risk doctrine in the sports context does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowl-
edge of potential risk, but rather the nature of the defendant’s duty). 
 25 Griggas v. Clauson, 128 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (finding a jury verdict in 
favor of plaintiff proper where defendant hit plaintiff twice from behind during basketball 
game); Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520–21, 527 (10th Cir. 1979) (discussing 
plaintiff’s rights where defendant struck plaintiff’s neck during professional football game); 
Averill v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812, 814–15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (baseball club not liable for 
catcher’s assault on batter); Overall v. Kadella, 361 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing a hockey player was permitted to recover when defendant player intentionally punched him 
in the face at the conclusion of the game). 
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baseball player? The answer to the aforementioned question should 
also be provided by a jury, the finder of fact, in a tort suit. Instead, the 
cases are replete with instances of judges resolving the assumption of 
risk defense as a matter of law, deciding whether or not a particular 
course of conduct lies within or without the normally expected con-
duct incidental to the sport.26  Because judges must often announce the 
basis for their decisions, the grounds for the finding are amenable to 
analysis.  Typically, judges rely on the trial testimony of witnesses, plus 
a recitation of similar cases, to resolve the issue of whether or not cer-
tain conduct falls within the normally expected occurrences in the 
game.27  Thus, the opinions of a few witnesses, coupled with apparent 
connections to similar cases, form the basis for findings of judicial fact 
as to an empirical matter. 
B. Expectations Defined 
What is problematic about this methodology, apart from the fact 
that it may well produce incorrect answers, is that the judicial finding, 
once announced, sets the standard for future cases.28  Once a court 
determines, on the basis of testimony and similar cases, that a baseball 
batter “expects” to be subject to an intentional bean-ball from the 
pitcher, for example, then a batter in a subsequent game, who is sub-
ject to an identical harm, may not claim he did not expect it.29  The 
judge’s determination of expectations defines the sport itself.30 
For example, in Bourque v. Duplechin, during a softball game, the 
defendant, running from first to second base, veered a few feet out of 
the base path in an effort to prevent the second baseman, the plaintiff, 
from completing a double play.31  The court held that the plaintiff as-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Knight, 834 P.2d at 706 (holding that “the question of the existence and scope of a de-
fendant’s duty of care is a legal question which depends on the nature of the sport or activity in 
question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity, and is an issue to be decided by 
the court, rather than the jury.”); Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (2007) (stating that “‘a court need 
not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead 
must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to 
that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from 
the particular risk of harm.’” (quoting Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006)). 
 27 See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 708-12.  
 28 See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393, 395 (Cal. 2006). 
 29 See id. at 393 (finding, as a matter of law, being intentionally hit by a bean-ball is an 
inherent risk of baseball.). 
 30 See id. at 395 (noting that “the boxer who steps into the ring consents to his opponent's 
jabs; the football player who steps onto the gridiron consents to his opponent's hard tackle; the 
hockey goalie who takes the ice consents to face his opponent's slapshots; and, here, the baseball 
player who steps to the plate consents to the possibility the opposing pitcher may throw near or 
at him.”). 
 31 Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
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sumed the risks from a batted ball, or from a runner, both “common 
occurrences,” if the plaintiff had remained on the base path.32  The 
plaintiff did not, however, “assume the risk of [the defendant] going 
out of his way to run into him at full speed when [the plaintiff] was 
five feet away from the base.”33  This conduct, the court held, was “un-
expected and unsportsmanlike.”34   
Decisions on these grounds are intensely factual and thus incapa-
ble of easy generalization.35  It is speculative to assess which fact of the 
defendant’s conduct comprised the unexpected, and thus uncon-
sented-to aspect, that gave rise to the defendant’s liability: the fact 
that the collision came at full speed, or was outside the baseline, or 
was five feet outside that line and not four or three feet outside the 
line.  Yet the court in Bourque ruled as a legal matter that the plaintiff 
did not assume the risk of defendant’s conduct, thus precluding the 
defendant’s main defense.36 Despite the elusiveness of capturing the 
scope of plaintiff’s consent as to base runners, the decision is illustra-
tive of the unmistakable import from this and other decisions: through 
tort decisions, the courts have come to define the expectations of par-
ticipants in sporting contests.37 
One notable case stemmed from a collegiate baseball game in 
which a pitcher for a California junior-college team hit an opposing 
batter on the head, splitting his helmet and causing injury.38  Because 
the pitcher's teammate had been hit the previous inning, the purpose 
of the pitch was seemingly retaliatory.39  One defense offered by the 
District, which operated the college and hosted the game, was that the 
batter, by choosing to play in a baseball game, "assumed the risk" of 
being thrown at by an opposing pitcher, even if the pitch was inten-
tionally aimed at his head in anger.40 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 42. Bourque held the defendant liable based on proof of negligence. One key 
aspect of the decision, however, was the court’s determination that the defendant’s unexpected 
conduct resulted from a reckless lack of concern for other participants. Thus, Bourque may fairly 
be understood as partaking of the more general modern trend to require recklessness for tort 
liability arising from a sports contest. 
 33 Id. at 43. 
 34 Id.  
 35 See Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 787-788, 790 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding in 
women’s softball game, risk of collision at second base inheres in game; standard of care is rea-
sonably prudent base runner attempting to gain second base). 
 36 Bourque, 331 So. 2d  at 43. 
 37 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706 (Cal. 1992). 
 38 Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 385-386  (Cal. 2006). 
 39 Id. at 385-386, 393-394. Curiously, the appellate decision does not mention whether or 
not the pitcher, on cross-examination, admitted to throwing at the batter intentionally. 
 40 Id. at 391, 400 (arguing that the District owed Avila no duty of care). 
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California divides the doctrine of assumption of risk into two 
categories: primary and secondary.41  Under the latter, the pitcher in 
this case would owe the batter a duty of care, a duty not to negligently 
or intentionally injure the batter, and the question would be whether 
the batter knowingly exposed himself to the risk of the pitcher's fail-
ure to meet that duty.42  However, under the former, "primary" as-
sumption of risk doctrine, the pitcher owes the batter no duty of care 
at all.43  Being thrown at is just part of the game, and no liability at-
taches regardless of the pitcher’s intent or the batter’s knowledge.  
The California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of primary as-
sumption of risk to hold that, as a matter of law, a pitcher intentionally 
throwing at a batter is part of the game, and thus one of the risks the 
batter assumes when he steps into the box.44  
The determination that batters reasonably expect bean-ball 
pitches appears to be a factual, empirical question, yet the court's an-
swer to this question was derived from anecdote: the court's opinion 
recites various instances of bean-balls and statements concerning 
bean-balls and concludes that they are within the common expecta-
tion of batters.45  This form of offhand empiricism is a poor substitute 
for the real thing.  Yet grand empirical pronouncements based on an-
ecdote, if based on anything at all, permeate legal decisions.46  With this 
decision, whether true as a factual matter or not, as a matter of law in 
California the intentional bean-ball is within the field of risks that bat-
ters assume.47 
Although the Avila court posed an empirical question, it may 
have not been interested in a “correct” empirical answer.  Instead, as is 
repeatedly the case in the application of the assumption of risk de-
fense, the more plausible observation is that the California court chose 
to define the sport of "baseball" to include the bean-ball.  This choice 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 1235 (Cal. 1975) (abrogating doctrine of 
contributory negligence and adopting rule of comparative negligence); Knight, 834 P.2d at 703 
(interpreting the Li decision and defining primary and secondary assumption of risk). See also 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (2012). 
 42 See Knight, 834 P.2d at 703, 704. 
 43 See id. at 704. 
 44 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394. 
 45 Id. at 393.  
 46 See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 486, 585 (2007) (finding that being struck by a 
carelessly hit ball is an inherent risk in golf, the court noted “[w]hile golf may not be as physically 
demanding as . . . basketball or football, risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport. Hitting a golf 
ball at a high rate of speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an 
unintended direction. If every ball behaved as the golfer wished, there would be little ‘sport’ in 
the sport of golf. That shots go awry is a risk that all golfers, even the professionals, assume when 
they play.”). 
 47 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 (finding “[f]or better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a 
fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of baseball.”). 
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suggests a larger role for the assumption of risk defense, one that is 
infused with policy considerations.   
First, courts in tort suits arising from sports contests are clearly 
concerned about the introduction or intrusion of tort liability into 
sporting activities.48  Imposing tort liability for wrongful pitches would 
require judges and juries to assess the unstated intentions of pitchers.  
It would also require evaluating whether the club or the coach fol-
lowed the proper standard of care in training the pitcher, and did not 
negligently employ a pitcher without adequate control so as to avoid 
wild pitches.  As a result, the introduction of tort law would put a 
premium on control pitchers over hard-throwing but comparatively 
wild pitchers.  This might introduce a measure of self-dealing into 
game decisions, as coaches might put less effective but better-control 
pitchers on the mound in order to avoid personal liability, even if the 
team’s interests were otherwise.  
Second, courts liberally applying the assumption-of-risk defense 
might conclude that opposing teams can minimize the frequency and 
danger of brush-back pitches better than judicial tribunals.  By con-
cluding that the batter "assumed the risk" as a matter of law, the Cali-
fornia court was effectively deciding that the intentional harm done 
by the pitcher would result in no legal remedy.49  Under these circum-
stances, the batter's remedy is retaliation: the pay-back pitch where his 
teammate throws at an opposing batter.  The denial of a legal remedy 
makes sense if the teams can minimize the joint risks of batting by 
working together, under the implicit threat of retaliation, to avoid un-
necessarily throwing at opposing batters. 
C. Football Head Injuries 
Oddly, the fact that so many former football players suffer from 
injuries resulting from concussive and sub-concussive head traumas 
militates in favor of the defense.  The more common the event, the 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) (noting that, “even when a participant’s 
conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed 
by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well fundamentally alter 
the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls 
close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.”);  Avila, 131 P.3d  at 394 (noting that 
“it is one thing for an umpire to punish a pitcher who hits a batter by ejecting him from the 
game, or for a league to suspend the pitcher; it is quite another for tort law to chill any pitcher 
from throwing inside.”). 
 49 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 (finding “[i]t is not the function of tort law to police such con-
duct.”). 
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more plausible is the claim of assumption of risk.50  In the offhand em-
piricism of the courtroom, anecdote is evidence, and the claim that an 
omnipresent aspect of the game of professional football such as heads 
colliding causes injury seems, by the very evidence the plaintiffs will 
adduce, widespread and thus part of the game.  In short, the game of 
football, as the court will likely come to define it, inevitably includes 
repeated blows to the head, thus precluding participants injured by 
those blows to complain about their ineluctable consequences. 
The fact that the employer-employee relationship in the NFL is 
established through collective bargaining also militates in favor of the 
defense.  Players are aware of the risks of the game and bargain over 
the terms and conditions of employment on a regular basis.  Unlike 
other instances of risks allegedly hidden by the defendant, such as the 
allegations against tobacco company defendants in some of the ciga-
rette litigation,51 here the plaintiffs are not faceless consumers but in-
stead are unionized employees with substantial input into all facets of 
the game, including the rules of the game.  The decision of the players, 
acting collectively and through their bargaining unit, to voluntarily 
accept the rules of the game also suggests they voluntarily accepted 
the consequences of those rules.  Those consequences include re-
peated blows to the head. 
On average, it would appear that much football head trauma, al-
though certainly not all of it, resulted from “legal” conduct, that is, 
from conduct on the field that is explicitly or implicitly permitted by 
the rules of the game.  The two most common activities that cause hits 
to the head are blocking and tackling, both permitted activities.52  Al-
though “leading with the head” is counseled against, the head is at-
tached to the shoulders, and it is going to be in harm’s way whenever 
the upper body is used to block or tackle, which is to say on nearly 
every play.  If the damaging blows to the head came exclusively or 
primarily from conduct not permitted by the rules of the game, such as 
from spearing or head-butting, for example, then the plaintiffs’ claims 
would be stronger.  The players in that scenario could claim that the 
scope of their consent was limited to conduct permitted by the game 
rules, and excluded conduct expressly prohibited by the game rules.  
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, Prosser & Keeton, TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984)  (“One who enters into a sport, game 
or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent with the understood rules of 
the game.”).  
 51 See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (“In this state negligence 
and deceit lawsuit, a jury found that Jesse Williams' death was caused by smoking and that peti-
tioner Philip Morris, which manufactured the cigarettes he favored, knowingly and falsely led 
him to believe that smoking was safe.”). 
 52 Roger Goodell, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES AND CASEBOOK OF THE NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE § 3, 34, R. 3 (2012), available at http://www.nfl.com/rulebook. 
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The players could then argue that the game’s owners or employers 
should have taken stronger measures to protect players from extra-
legal conduct outside the assumed risks.  But the facts are the oppo-
site: the players appear to have been injured by legal conduct, unmis-
takably of the kind to which they expressly consented and anticipated 
in playing the game.  They had a choice.  They could have walked off 
the field.53 
Finally, the plaintiffs will attempt to avoid the assumption of risk 
defense by claiming that the NFL had information about the long-
term risks of playing the game and withheld that information from the 
players.  Unaware of the true risks involved in the sport, the plaintiffs 
cannot be deemed to have assumed them.  This contention will lie at 
the heart of the trial advocacy concerning assumption of risk.  Un-
doubtedly some “smoking gun” memorandum or email will be discov-
ered wherein some NFL consultant fretted out loud about the risks of 
head injuries, only to be told to proceed cautiously or gather more 
evidence by league superiors.  This sort of evidence can have great 
appeal to a jury.  It may not move a judge, however, who will assess 
the empirical claim about expectations and known risks as a matter of 
law.  A substantial body of literature about football injuries and their 
effect on long-term health has appeared for many years in the popular 
press.54  As a matter of law, the players have as much access to that 
literature as does the NFL.  It will be difficult for the players to claim 
that they played the game unaware of the risks inherent in the sport. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358-359  (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding 
player could have refused to play on slippery outfield, thus assumption of risk negates claim 
against facility and employer for unsafe work condition); Zachardy v. Geneva Coll., 733 A.2d 648 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding assumption of risk barred baseball player from recovery from 
injury sustained on baseball field with ruts and depression because he voluntarily continued to 
play);  Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 395 (Cal. 2006) (finding that because Avila 
voluntarily participated in the baseball game his consent would bar any battery claim as a matter 
of law). 
 54 Head Injuries in Football, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/football/head_injuries/index.html (The New York Times has 
published articles related to football head injuries dating from 1894 to the present). 
